The Vital Role of Ideas in Industrial Policy Changes in Ireland During the 1980s by Hogan, John & O\u27Rourke, Brendan
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Conference papers School of Marketing 
2014-04-19 
The Vital Role of Ideas in Industrial Policy Changes in Ireland 
During the 1980s 
John Hogan 
Technological University Dublin, john.hogan@dit.ie 
Brendan O'Rourke 
Technological University Dublin, brendan.orourke@tudublin.ie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/buschmarcon 
 Part of the Political Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hogan, J, & O'Rourke, B. (2014) The Critical Role of Ideas: A Discursive Institutionalist Approach to 
Understanding Change in Irish Industrial Policy. Midwest Political Science Association Annual 
Conference, Chicago, 5 April. 
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and 
open access by the School of Marketing at ARROW@TU 
Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in Conference 
papers by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU 
Dublin. For more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
The vital role of ideas in industrial policy changes in Ireland 
during the 1980s 
 
John Hogan, 
College of Business, 
Dublin Institute of Technology,  




Brendan K. O’Rourke (Research Fellow), 
College of Business, 
Dublin Institute of Technology,  





Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, 
Palmer Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, April 2014 
 
ABSTRACT 
Employing a discursive institutionalist approach in the form of the critical juncture theory 
(CJT), this paper examines the nature of the changes to Irish industrial policy in the mid 
1980s, a time when the country went through one of its  worst economic crises.  Did these 
policy changes, ushered in by the Telesis Report of 1982, constitute a transformation in 
industrial policy, or a continuation of a previously established policy pathway, and if so why?  
To answer this question the paper explores the roles played by various change agents, and 
their ideas, in altering the industrial policy that had been established during the 1950s, when 
the country first opened up to foreign trade and investment.  The findings ultimately help 
explain why Irish industrial policy did not undergo a radical transformation during the 1980s. 
 
Keywords: Crisis; critical juncture; ideas; industrial; policy.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the current context of economic crisis we examine how earlier Irish governments, also 
confronted with challenging economic circumstances, sought to alter the country’s industrial 
policy.  During the second half of the 1970s the Irish economy performed relatively well, 
after weaker performance following the first oil shock.  However, recovery proved transitory, 
as pro cyclical fiscal policies fed inflation.  By the 1980s, the economy shrank, 
unemployment and emigration returned.  This led to a questioning of industrial policy in 
place since the 1950s.  What changes were made to this policy during the 1980s?  And what 
lessons might this hold for contemporary policy makers?  We use  CJT to investigate these 
questions.      
 According to Hogan (2006) a critical juncture is a multi stage event.  A crisis can 
create a situation where extant policiesand associated ideas  are called into question.  Any 
subsequent displacement of the extant paradigm by a new set of ideas on how policy should 
operate can lead to  radical policy change.  Without ideational change, policy change will 
likely be only  relatively minor.  The hierarchy of goals underpinning a policy will remain 
unaltered.  In lieu of alternatives, extant policy soldiers on.   CJT seeks to pinpoint  key ideas 
and actors involved in the process of policy change.   
 
THE LITERATURE ON POLICY CHANGE 
Fully comprehending policy change would require knowledge of the objectives of hundreds 
of actors from across a jurisdiction, involve highly technical issues and span many years 
(Sabatier, 2007).   Such complexity means that  policy change has been examined using a 
range of theoretical frameworks. 
The  incremental policy change literature  recognizes the subtleties of gradual change 
during periods of stability and continuity during upheavals.  Incremental policy change can 
be transformative over a long time (Thelen, 2004: 292).   
The policy streams approach incorporates a role for policy entrepreneurs in policy 
change (Kingdon, 1995).  When a window of opportunity forms, due to a shock, policy 
entrepreneurs attempt to gain government support for the solutions they put forward by 
linking problems, ideas and politics (Mintrom & Norman, 2009).  There are a variety of 
solutions, in the form of ideas - as per the garbage can model (Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1972).   
Sabatier’s (1988) and Jenkins-Smith’s (1990) Advocacy Coalition framework (ACF), 
contributes to the policy process literature through taking: 
 
Longer term time perspectives to understand policy change; a need for a more 
complex view of subsystems to include both researchers and intergovernmental 
relations; a need for more attention to the role of science and policy analysis in 
public policy; and a need for a more realistic model of the individual rooted 
more deeply in psychology rather than microeconomics.  (Weible et al., 2011: 
349) 
  
An advocacy coalition consists of ‘elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, and 
researchers who share a particular belief system’ (Sabatier, 1988: 139), forming an alliance to 
obtain greater influence in the policy-making process (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010: 16).  This 
approach shows how groups can lead to the development of new ideas for policy change 
(Jones & Jenkins-Smith, 2009).  
 Similarly the Epistemic Communities Framework (ECF) focuses on networks with 
expertise, who share knowledge, as they seek policy change (Haas, 2004). According to ECF, 
a proliferation of new ideas on policy change may be triggered by uncertainty over a problem 
(Meijerink, 2005: 1063).  Both ACF and ECF examine the role of networks, ideas, 
information and learning processes in policy change (Haas, 2004).   
In contrast to the ACF and ECF,  Baumgartner and Jones (1993) see policy change is 
characterized by periods of stability broken by instances of radical transformation – 
punctuated equilibrium.  Policy stasis results from the inability of policy makers to manage 
more than a limited number of issues simultaneously, or from the capacity of supporters of 
extant policy to reduce the pressure for policy change (True et al. 2007).  Significant policy 
changes may occur when opponents of extant policy create new perceptions of the issue at 
stake and gain support for their new ideas at a higher administrative level (Hogan and Feeney 
2012).  Once the new policy becomes accepted amongst policy entrepreneurs and the political 
elite a new policy monopoly, and stasis, is instituted (Meijernik 2005).   
Hogan and Doyle (2007), building on ideas of punctuated equilibrium, claim that a 
critical juncture consists of a crisis, ideational change (extant ideational collapse, new 
ideational consolidation) and a radical policy change.  They argue that outside influencers 
(public, media, NGOs etc), policy entrepreneurs (civil servants, technocrats, academics, 
economists,interest groups) and political entrepreneurs (elected politicians) act, in the words 
of Kleistra and Mayer (2001), as either carriers or barriers to policy change.  Here ideas can 
be seen to be about what is, and what ought to be (Mehta. 2010).   Discursive interaction 
(exchange of ideas) between these policy elites and the general public, moving in multiple 
directions, generates the alternative ideas that lead to collective action (Schmidt, 2008).; as 
well as constituting an effort on our part to ‘endogenize’ policy change (Schmidt, 2010) – 
making the exogenous shock less significant vis-à-vis ideational change.  Should a broad 
consensus develop that the paradigm underpinning extant policy is inadequate then ideational 
collapse occurs.  But, sometimes society, failing to reach consensus on a replacement idea, 
re-embraces the failing idea (Legro, 2000).  The theory presents the notion that, even in the 
wake of a crisis, policy failure and ideational collapse, there is no guarantee new ideas will 
become policy.  However, if the actors seeking policy change reach agreement on a 
replacement paradigm, and gain support at a high administrative level, significant policy 
change may follow.  In this environment, political entrepreneurs can act as the bridge 
between coalitions advocating new policy ideas and the institutions implementing them 
(Donnelly and Hogan 2012).    
CJT uses ideas in a form of “discursive institutionalism” to overcome the limitations 
in “traditional” new institutionalist approaches in explaining policy change – their static and 
overly determinist nature (Schmidt, 2008; 2010).  In this instance, discursive institutions are 
not rule following structures of the older institutionalisms that serve as restraints on actors, 
but are internal to agents as constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning 
(Schmidt, 2010).    
 
CASE STUDY: TESTING FOR A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN IRISH INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY IN THE 1980s 
 
From the 1950s onwards, Irish industrial policy moved away from protectionism, seeking to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) as a stimulus for growth and skills transfer (Girvin, 
1994: 125).  This strategy was adopted in a climate of severe recession, emigration and a 
precipitously falling population.  Thus, dire economic performance prompted a fundamental 
reappraisal of policy in the 1950s. 
 Throughout the 1980s Ireland again  experienced severe difficulties.  In an 
environment of economic stagnation, there was concern that emigration would again 
depopulate the country, denuding it of its educated young people (O’Rourke & Hogan, 2013).  
Thus, once more Irish society, and its policy makers, experienced great uncertainty. Would 
the  the state continue to rely on FDI as  its engine for growth or would there be a radical 
policy change once more?  
 
THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE THEORY 
 
Critical junctures result in the adoption of a particular arrangement from among alternatives.  
Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in that direction (Mahoney 2003: 53).  For 
some, a critical juncture constitutes an extended period of reorientation (Collier and Collier, 
1991; Mahoney 2003), while for others, it is a brief period in which one direction, or another, 
is taken (Garrett and Lange, 1995; Hogan; 2006).  Recently, Flockhart (2005) used critical 
junctures to explain the gap between Danish voters and their politician’s attitudes towards the 
European Union (EU), while Wolff (2012) examined the development of an EU counter-
terrorism policy through critical junctures.  However, the literature is inconsistent in how it 
differentiates critical junctures from other forms of policy change - such as incremental 
change.   Hogan (2006) sought to resolve this by setting out a revised critical juncture theory 
and developing a framework capable of testing for critical junctures and producing consistent 
findings.    
 The literature on critical junctures often examines them from the perspective of crises, 
emphasizing the tensions that precede critical junctures, as per historical institutionalism.  
However, according to Hogan and Doyle (2007), a critical juncture consists of discreet, but 
interconnected elements: crisis, ideational change and radical policy change – the ideational 
element moving the theory into the realm of discursive institutionalism.  But, how ideas 
influence policy is complex, rising questions such as: Where do ideas come from? How do 
they relate to failing policies? And, why does the paradigm underlying a failing policy 
sometimes change, resulting in policy change, whereas at other times it remains unaltered?  
To understand the social world "necessitates a deep and systematic engagement with ideas, 
because without them, neither stability nor change in social systems can be fully understood" 
(Blyth, 2011: 84).  Without discourse – understood as the exchange of ideas - it is difficult to 
explain how ideas transform from individual thoughts into collective actions (Schmidt, 2010).  
The theory’s third stage tests policy change using Hall’s (1993) three orders of policy change. 
 Testing each stage involves developing observable implications that can be evaluated 
individually.  The framework (discussed below) has been applied to a variety of policy areas: 
change in macroeconomic policy, the rolling back of privatization policy and the study of 
policy change in nondemocratic states (see Hogan, 2006; Hogan and Doyle, 2007; Hogan and 
Cavatorta, 2013).  This CJT helps provide insights into the key events, ideas and roles 
performed by various actors in the policy change process.   
 
Testing for a Crisis 
A crisis implies extant policies are failing to address a problem (Boin, Hart, Stern, & 
Sundelius, 2005) and as a result can unleash powerful forces for change that can have a long 
lasting impact (Haggard 2003).  Economic crises are more common in modern democracies 
than wars or revolutions.  Hogan and Doyle's (2007: 888) critical juncture theory, recognising 
that identifying a macro-economic crisis is difficult, involving subjective and objective 
deliberations, uses 12 encompassing observable implications that draw upon the currency 
crisis, recession and policy reform work of Garuba (2006), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh 
(2003), Pei & Adesnik (2000:139) and Yu, Lai, & Wang, (2006: 439).  These observables 
identify changes in nominal economic performance and perceptions of economic health (See 
Appendix A).  
 
Testing for Ideational Change 
Ideational change can result in a transformed policy environment, but understanding how 
ideas influence policy is something theorists have long grappled with.  The failure of extant 
policies to resolve a crisis provides a window of opportunity for change agents to contest the 
viability of the underlying paradigm (Kingdon, 1995).  These agents can gain power for their 
ideas by setting the agenda for reform in the policy sphere (Schmidt, 2010).   
To address the question of why ideas underlying failing policies sometimes change, 
resulting in policy change, whereas at other times they remain unaltered, Donnelly and 
Hogan (2012), drawing on Legro (2000), argue that significant policy change depends upon a 
broad range of change agents (outside influencers and policy entrepreneurs) perceiving the 
extant paradigm as inadequate (collapse) and coalescing (consolidation) around a set of new 
ideas, championed by a political entrepreneur.  As Blyth (2002: 37) argues, ‘ideas facilitate 
the reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources among agents who 
attempt to resolve the crisis.’  Ideational change constitutes the intermediating factor between 
a crisis and policy change.  We have seven observable implications for identifying extant 
ideational collapse and new ideational consolidation (See Appendix B).  
However, ‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a 
replacement could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old 
orthodoxy’ (Legro, 2000: 424).  This is because in addition to policy viability, policy ideas 
must have administrative and political viability (Hall, 1989).   
 
Testing for Policy Change 
The CJT's final stage employs Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second and their order change 
to develop observables implications to identify policy change (See Appendix C).  The 
observables incorporate Hogan's (2006) notions of swift and enduring change.  As we are 
dealing with a critical juncture (radical change), we assume this is not a long process; 
otherwise, it would constitute incremental change.  In an environment full of competing 
policy entrepreneurs and ideas, such a policy change should survive a change of government 
(Hogan and Doyle 2007).  This addresses the problem in policy dynamics of defining and 
operationalizing the scope and timing of policy change (Howlett, 2009).  As Capano and 
Howlett (2009) argue, when a policy is regarded as fundamental it is usually based on a 
multi-year perspective.  These observables enabled the differentiation of policy changes, 
ranging from minor adjustments to the setting of policy instruments, to paradigm changes in 
policy goals (Hall, 1993). 
According to the theory, after a crisis, but in the absence of ideational change, policy 
change may be of the first or second order, but not the third (paradigm shift).  The presence 
of ideational change will lead to third order policy change – which according to the 
framework constitutes a critical juncture. 
 
Evaluation of the Findings  
 
To evaluate the evidence for a crisis, extant ideational collapse, new ideational consolidation 
and the type of policy change, the finding for each observable implication was evaluated 
independently by each author and assigned a score according to whether it indicated strong 
(3), medium (2), weak (1) or no support (0).  The stronger the inter-coder agreement 
indicated between the authors’ findings, the greater the likelihood these are accurate.  This 
approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of policy change.  As interpretation plays 
a part in divining meaning from codes, the reporting of findings involves thick description of 
categories and contexts (Polgar & Thomas, 2008: 248).  We found inter-coder agreement to 
be above 91 per cent; and Krippendorff’s alphas above 0.8, which Krippendorff (2004: 241) 
deems reliable beyond chance (see Appendix). 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF MACROECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
The Irish economy in the 1980s  
During the late 1970s the Irish economy performed relatively well, having recovered from the 
effects of the 1974 oil crisis.  The high levels of inflation and unemployment, that peaked in 
the middle of the decade, had begun to fall, while growth returned (Leddin and Walsh, 1998: 
26).  We can see from Table 1 that real gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 4.5 
percent on average between 1975 and 1979.   
 In 1977, a new Fianna Fáil government employed an expansionary fiscal policy at a 
time when the economy was growing at an unsustainable rate (OECD, 1982: 10).  This  fiscal 
injection, in pursuit of a “dash or growth” that economists warned was unsustainable, led to a 
deterioration in fiscal balances, with the public sector-borrowing requirement increasing from 
13 percent of GNP in 1976 to 20 percent in 1981 (FitzGerald, 2000: 43).  This period saw 
record deficits in the current external balance and the public sector accounts (OECD, 1983: 
7).  As we can see from Table 1, inflation peaked at 20.4 percent in 1981, while interest rates 
remained high.     








to GNP ratio 
Growth Rates in 





1974 5.4 17.0 12 55.39 4.2 94.37706 
1975 7.3 20.9 10 58.05 2.0 86.44022 
1976 9.0 18.0 14.8 62.5 2.1 94.96721 
1977 8.8 13.6 6.8 61.4 6.9 102.0045 
1978 8.1 7.6 11.9 63.5 6.7 103.7894 
1979 7.1 13.2 16.5 70.65 2.4 109.601 
1980 7.3 18.2 14.0 71.91 1.9 106.4831 
1981 9.9 20.4 16.5 77.45 1.1 105.0999 
1982 11.4 17.1 14.0 86.53 -0.7 97.81183 
1983 13.6 10.5 12.3 97.60 -1.6 101.7349 
1984 15.4 8.6 14 106.28 2.3 112.7388 
1985 16.7 5.4 10.3 108.60 0.8 112.172 
1986 17.1 3.8 13.3 123.26 -1.1 101.1026 
1987 17.7 3.1 9.3 124.07 4.6 104.8707 
1988 16.4 2.1 8.0 117.35 4.4 109.5299 
1989 15.1 4.1 12.0 106.84 7.0 117.0717 
Sources: European Commission (1997); Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002); Leddin and Walsh (1998); 
Mitchell (1992); United Nations (2013). 
 
As the economy slowed, then began to shrink and unemployment and interest rates rose, 
emigration increased (OECD 1982: 10).  More people were unemployed by June 1981 than at 
any time in the country’s history (The Irish Times, 1981a: 6).  The balance of payments 
deficit was 13 percent of GNP (Central Bank of Ireland, 1982: 16).  The government’s 
spending was so high that the total amount budgeted for 1981 had been consumed by midyear 
.  Consequently, almost half of exchequer borrowing for 1981 went to financing the current 
budget deficit (Bacon et al., 1986: 6), which stood at an unsustainable 7.3 percent of GNP 
(Leddin and O’Leary, 1995: 167).     
 The debt to GNP ratio was on an unbroken upward trajectory from 1977 to 1987, 
surpassing 100 percent by 1984.  Between 1979 and 1986 the rate of increase of debt to GNP 
regularly exceeded 10 percent per annum.  The fiscal deficit, intended in the late 1970s to be 
temporary, became impossible to eliminate.  Imports and exports fluctuated wildly, reflected 
in figures for trade openness in Table 1.  Only inflation improved after 1981.  By 1986, the 
economy had been in continuous stagnation since 1980, contracting for the third time in five 
years (see Table 1).  An Irish Independent poll found that a majority of citizens were 
skeptical of the politicians’ ability to run the country properly (O’Regan, 1981: 1). 
The need to control public expenditure and prevent excessive reliance on foreign 
borrowing dictated the adoption of tighter fiscal policies.  However, the catch-all nature of 
Irish political parties induced governments to buy off short-term pressure from interest 
groups through ad hoc policy concessions.  This worked against the imposition of severe 
economic policies and the formulation of enduring agreements between the state and 
economic interest groups, like those in Continental neo-corporatism. 
By the mid 1980s there was unanimity in the domestic and foreign media concerning 
the economy.  Finlan (1987: 16) writing in The Irish Times, described the economy as being 
“on the ropes” . The Economist pointed out that by 1987 ‘the people of Ireland were deeply in 
debt to the outside world, three times as much per head as Mexico’ (The Economist, 1987: 
53).  The Irish Times (1987a: 10) noted that some economic commentators were advocating 
                                                 
1
 Measured by the trade to GDP ratio. This is acquired by adding the value of imports and exports and dividing 
by GDP. 
debt repudiation due to the scale of indebtedness.  Overall, the general consensus in the 
newspapers was one of stagnation and crisis.  
Most economists were critical of economic policy and performance during the 1980s 
(Bradley and FitzGerald, 1989: iii).  While initially boosting the economy, the government's 
debt-finance plan for rapid development between 1977 and 1980 was a disaster, due to the 
depression and debt-burden that followed (O'Rourke, 2010).  Bacon et al. (1986: 1) observed 
that ‘the first half of the decade of the 1980s, taken as a whole, was a period of appalling 
economic performance.’  'It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Irish economic 
performance has been the least impressive in Western Europe, perhaps in all Europe' 
(Kennedy and Conniffe, 1986: 288). The Central Bank (1987: 7) foresaw  no immediate 
prospects for an improvement in growth or employment.  More worryingly, it argued that the 
situation did not permit for increases in welfare benefits to the disadvantaged.  An increasing 
level of poverty was eroding the lives of a growing segment of society (O'Morain, 1987: 7).  
As the OECD (1987: 77) put it: ‘by the mid-1980s a number of acute imbalances confronted 
the Irish economy.’  These imbalances were also making the business community worried.  
The Small Firms Association noted steadily declining business confidence (The Irish Times, 
1987b: 6).   Leading businessman Tony O’Reilly warned of the dangers of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) involvement in running the countryif the crisis was not resolved 
(Keenan, 1987: 8).   
 After 1982 all the major parties agreed on the need to stabilise the debt/GNP ratio 
(Mjøset, 1992: 381). The state changed its overall policy from focusing on employment to 
balancing budgets, export growth, and international competitiveness.  A member of Fine 
Gael, Alexis Fitzgerald, remarked that in just 4 years Fianna Fáil had doubled the national 
debt it had taken 57 years to accumulate (The Irish Times, 1981a: 6).  Subsequently, Prime 
Minister Garrett FitzGerald acknowledged that the national debt and interest payments, rising 
faster than national income, constituted a vicious circle, each year consuming a larger share 
of taxation (The Irish Times, 1987c: 10).  Opposition leader, Charles Haughey, remarked that 
‘the economy is at a total stand-still’ (Cooney, 1987a: 9).  Amongst the public consensus held 
that the country was in the midst of a serious financial crisis (Cooney, 1987b: 1). ‘By 1987 
the Irish economy was universally seen to have reached nadir’ (The Economist, 1992: 6). 
 
Table 2 – Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis in Ireland in the 1980s 
Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis  Coder 1 Coder 2 
O1.  Stagnant or negative GDP growth 3 3 
O2.  Unemployment above 10 percent 3 3 
O3.  Inflation and interest rates above 10 percent 3 3 
O4.  National debt, as a percentage of GDP, increasing at more 
than 10 percent, annually 
3 3 
O5.  The level of economic openness declining 3 2 
O6.  Public perceives economic crisis 2 2 
O7.  Media perceive economic crisis 3 3 
O8.  Economic/political commentators perceive economic crisis 3 3 
O9.  Central bank perceives economic crisis 3 3 
O10.  OECD perceives economic crisis 3 3 
O11.  Elected representatives perceive economic crisis 3 3 
O12.  Government pronouncements consistent with crisis 
management approach 
3 3 
 Strong Strong 
(3) strong support | (2) medium support | (1) weak support | (0) no support | (N/A) not available 
From Table 2, we see that both authors felt the majority of observable implications support 
the argument that Ireland, during the 1980s, experienced an economic crisis.  The next 
sections test for ideational change in industrial policy during this crisis and the nature of the 
policy change that followed. 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF IDEATIONAL AND POLICY CHANGE  
The Ideas Underlying Industrial Policy 
 
The Ideas Underlying Industrial Policy 
After opening its economy in the 1950s, Ireland sought to attract labour intensive industries 
based around technically mature products (Lee, 1992).  In the context of the weakness of 
indigenous industry, this seemed a realistic alternative capable of delivering industrial 
development (Lee, 1992).  By the beginning of the 1970s FDI accounted for the majority of 
new manufacturing jobs and exports.  However, this approach led to the sidelining of 
indigenous industry in the policy process (Girvin 1989).  It also failed to create high value 
jobs and the foreign companies were footloose (O’Malley, 1985).  In response, the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA) started to look at attracting more sophisticated overseas 
producers in pharmaceuticals and electronics (Wrigley, 1985).  However, the economic 
problems of the 1970s led to a questioning of industrial policy by society, the media and 
policy entrepreneurs. 
 
The Cooper-Whelan Report 
The 1973 Cooper-Whelan report, co-authored by Noel Whelan, a civil servant, who later 
became Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, was sceptical of the long term benefits 
of FDI, as opposed to indigenous enterprise (Lee, 1992).    , This report questioned the weak 
links between FDI and indigenous industry.  By 1979, it was clear that the success of the FDI 
sector was not finding its way into the rest of the economy (Lee, 1992).   
This situation, impelled the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), then 
under Whelan's chairmanship, to commission an examination of Ireland’s industrial 
programme(Brunt, 1988: 32).  The objective was “to ensure that the Irish government’s 
industrial policy is appropriate to the creation of an internationally competitive industrial base 
in Ireland which will support increased employment and higher living standards” (Telesis, 
1982: 3).  This examination encompassed a number of reports, the most important of which 
was Telesis's (1982) examination of industrial policy.. 
 
 
The Telesis Report 
A Review of Industrial Policy, referred to as the Telesis Report, after praising the clarity and 
consistency of industrial policy, highlighted the problems of FDI, its impact on job creation 
and failure to create linkages with indigenous industry (Telesis, 1982).  Pointing out that 
sustained economic development and a high incomes economy relies on native 
entrepreneurship, the report queried the policy emphasis on foreign investment (Lee, 1992, 
531) and a culture of dependence on state aid (Sweeny, 1998: 103).  It argued that the IDA 
had not been as successful in attracting FDI as it suggested (Telesis, 1982).  Of jobs approved 
between 1972 and 1978 “only 20 percent were in place at the end of the period” (Coogan, 
1987: 6).  The report encouraged a shift “towards building strong indigenous companies in 
the export and sub-supply business sector” (Sweeny, 1998: 127) and that the proportion of 
funds given to domestic industries (one third of all funding available) be doubled by the end 
of the decade (Telesis, 1982).  The Telesis report "sent shock waves through the policy 
establishment" (Lee, 1992: 532).  This questioning of industrial policy challenged its 
intellectual coherence.  
 
Reaction to Telesis – Ideational Collapse 
In light of the criticisms of the IDA in Telesis, it disputed the findings of the report (O’Brien, 
1982: 1).  The IDA had become “the centre of policy-making, a point strongly criticised by 
Telesis” (Sweeney, 1998: 127). “The development effort aimed towards new indigenous 
industry must be reorganised to emphasise the building of structurally strong Irish companies 
rather than strong agencies to assist weak companies” (Telesis, 1982: 33).  Tánaiste, Dick 
Spring, admitted that Telesis pointed to failings in the overall industrial policy framework 
(Dáil Debates 342, cols. 861, 11 May 1983).   
There was ideational collapse as Whelan, the NESC, Telesis and a host of economists, 
constituting policy entrepreneurs, critiqued the orthodoxy underlying extant industrial policy, 
while other changes agents in the media and trade unions supported the ideas proposed by 
Telesis.  However, there was no clear political entrepreneur for these policy entrepreneurs to 
rally around.  This was partly down to the fact that Ireland, at the time, experienced a period 
of weak and unstable governments as the economic crisis gripping the country deepened (The 
Irish Times, 1981b: 12).  
 
Table 3 – Indication of Ideational Collapse 
Indication of Extant Ideational Collapse 
Coder 1 Coder2 
O13. Media questioning efficacy of current model 2 3 
O14.  Opposition critiques current model and propose alternative 
ideas 
1 1 
O15. Policy entrepreneurs critique current model and propose 
alternatives 
3 2 
O16.  Civil society organizations critique current model  3 2 
O17.  Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm 2 1 
O18.  External/international organizations critique current model 
and actively disseminate alternatives 
2 2 
Extant Ideational Collapse Strong Medium 
 
Changes in Industrial Policy 
 
Political Instability – Policy Drift 
Telesis found that extant industrial policy “did not go far enough in developing native skills 
in technology and marketing, the key elements of self-sustaining growth.  The foundations of 
the industrial superstructure therefore lacked depth” (Kennedy, 1986: 49).  The scale of the 
policy changes required by Telesis would take time to both implement and take effect 
(Kennedy, 1983: 34).  The ESRI, predicting the economic crisis would worsen, insisted that 
the necessary policy changes could not be delayed (O’Brien, 1983: 12).  
 
 [However] the period from December 1979 to December 1982 was one of 
the most remarkable periods in modern Irish history.  There were four 
changes of Taoiseach in that period, six Ministers for Finance, three changes 
of government and the Irish economy declined progressively to a level 
unprecedented for decades. (Browne, 1983: 5) 
 
Apart from crisis-induced cutbacks, no coherent ideas/policies emerged, as the governments 
were of such unstable character.  ‘Not only economically, but also politically, instability 
peaked in 1981-1982’ (Mjøset, 1992: 381). 
 By November 1982, when the majority Fine Gael-Labour Coalition came to power, 
with the national debt exceeding GNP and the current budget deficit out of control, a coherent 
set of corrective policies was essential.  The state of the public finances restricted the 
government to austerity measures.  .  However, the Coalition experienced difficulty in 
devising an effective strategy (O’Byrnes, 1986: 219).  It is against this background that we 
examine the government's response to Telesis.   
 
The Political Response to Telesis  
For Snoddy (1982), Telesis marks the ending of the phase of reliance on FDI and the 
beginning on a new phase focused on indigenous industry.  However, reality was more 
complex.  The Minister for Industry, John Bruton, insisted that it was critical not to lose sight 
of the contribution of 800 foreign firms, employing 80,000 workers (Dáil Debates 342, col. 
906, 11 May 1983).  Although reports from the ESRI and NESC, acknowledged that the Irish 
economy was in crisis and that change was required, the official response to Telesis was slow 
in coming.  the   
 The government official response in the form of a White Paper (Government of 
Ireland, 1984) came in the context of a severe economic crisis.  For some the White Paper 
“represented a pivotal document in the re-evaluation of the philosophy and strategic thrust of 
industrial policy” (Boylan, 1996: 196). There were indeed “several changes in the content of 
industrial policy” in response to Telesis (Kennedy, 1995: 59).  It was acknowledged that 
"Industrial policies which had clearly served Ireland well in the 1960s and 1970s are now 
having less success" (Government of Ireland, 1984: 3) and recognized that economic 
“flexibility, creativity and growth were all being thwarted by the dependence on foreign 
investment” (Munck, 1993: 158). Yet, in concert with Telesis (1982), the White Paper stated 
that there would be no radical change to incentives for FDI - "consistency and stability over 
many years of our policies for industrial development have been a major source of strength" 
(Government of Ireland, 1984: 7).  There was a radical change in that employment creation 
was no longer the sole objective and attention should focus on the international 
competiveness of the whole industrial sector (Brunt, 1988: 32).   Wealth creation now took 
precedence over job creation, as this permitted the development of the capacity to create jobs. 
There was to be greater selectivity, the White Paper seeking to advance the process of 
"picking winners", with the aim of developing domestic companies with export potential 
(Jacobsen, 1994: 169), and a promotion of enterprise to strengthen indigenous (Carr, 2000). 
The report also saw a shift away from manufacturing towards services.  
 
 
Alterations to Industrial Policy  
Under the coalition government, incentives were to be more selectively deployed, while 
indigenous enterprises were given greater attention through the creation of a National 
Development Corporation (NDC).  The objective was to foster an increase in the number of 
internationally traded companies, and to that end an export development scheme was set up.  
There was some change in relation to FDI, with more of a focus on foreign companies with 
R&D functions and the potential for linkages with domestic enterprises.  The National 
Planning Board s pointed to a lack of a manpower policy and argued that the appropriate 
ministers, not the IDA, ought to direct policy (Jacobsen, 1994: 168).      
1984 also saw the introduction of the Company Development Programme directed at 
indigenous companies and designed to assist planning (Bielenberg and Ryan, 2013: 29).  
Policy change could be seen in the National Linkage Programme in 1985, to achieve a more 
integrated development pattern between indigenous and foreign enterprises (Brunt, 1988 p. 
32).  It would focus on upgrading local suppliers by improving their technical knowhow and 
be selective in concentrating on companies “which had the potential to succeed” (Murdoch, 
1985: 14).  These approaches sought to achieve the new objectives of industrial policy: a 
greater focus on indigenous enterprises; addressing weaknesses in management and 
marketing; achieving better value for money and creating better linkages with FDI enterprises 
(Kennedy, 1995).  By 1985 the Irish Export Board (Córas Tráchtála (CTT)) was seeking to 
address the information needs of exporters, as identified in the White Paper, through the 
production of booklets entitled Guides for Exporting.  Nevertheless, the IDA continued to 
attract FDI, and in 1990, at unprecedented costs, secured a major investment from Intel 
(Bielenberg and Ryan, 2013: 29).  
"The Telesis report led to some measure of industrial policy reform, though this was 
less interventionist than the report envisaged” (Bielenberg and Ryan, 2013: 29).  Thus, 
industrial policy gradually responded to the critiques of Telesis (1982) and the NESC (1982), 
who criticized the failure of state support towards indigenous enterprises (O’Grada, 1997). 
However, as Hall (1989: 11) points out, states tend to be predisposed towards those policies 
with which they already have some favourable experience.  Thus, to regard the policy 
changes arising from Telesis, and the subsequent White Paper, as a break with extant 
industrial policy would be incorrect. Rather, they constituted a form of, what Streeck and 
Thelen (2005) refer to as, policy layering.  These moves represent learning effects, an effort 
to make extant policy work.  Despite Telesis, grants to indigenous firms increased by only 3 
percent between 1985 and 1989 (O’Hearn, 2001: 105).  Industrial policy was adjusted in 
1984, not transformed, due to a reluctance to break with past successes in attracting FDI.   
 
The Nature of the Policy Change  
Although the ideas underlying extant industrial policy might have collapsed in the wake of 
the economic crisis, and provided a window of opportunity for radical policy change, this did 
not occur.  Whelan, the NESC and Telesis, along with many other economists and 
commentators, acting as policy entrepreneurs, proposed alternative ideas to those underlying 
industrial policy.  However, in the absence of these change agents clustering around a 
political entrepreneur to champion their alternative paradigm in the policy-making 
environment, new ideational consolidation could not occur.  Despite the growing recognition 
that industrial policy was failing to produce the desired results, the Irish political 
establishment was reluctant to abandon a policy prescription that had, at least during the 
1960s and early 1970s, ended a century of depopulation and stagnation.  No political 
entrepreneur emerged during this period of ideational contestation.  Politicians only seemed 
interested in variations on the existing paradigm. In these circumstances, the ideas 
underpinning extant industrial industrial policy endured.  The collective mindset failed to 
disengaged from a reliance on FDI and shift the focus of industrial policy to indigenous 
enterprise.    
 
Table 4 – Indication of: (i) New Ideational Consolidation; (ii) Level of Policy Change 
Indication of New Ideational Consolidation   
O19.  Clear set of alternative ideas 3 3 
O20.  Political entrepreneur injecting new ideas into policy arena 0 0 
O21.  Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce 
consensus around a replacement paradigm 
0 0 
New Ideational Consolidation No No 
 Indication of Level of Policy Change   
O22.  Policy instrument settings changed 3 3 
O23.  Instruments of policy changed 1 2 
O24.  Goals behind policy changed 0 0 
Critical Juncture in Policy  No No 
(3) strong support | (2) medium support | (1) weak support | (0) no support | (N/A) not available 
 
In Table 3, we see that during the 1980s the ideas underpinning industrial policy's  focus on 
FDI had collapsed.  However, in the absence of a political entrepreneur willing to champion 
alternative ideas, change agents failed to consolidate around a replacement orthodoxy.  The 
observables indicate there was no critical juncture in industrial policy in 1984, the policy 
change being of the first order (Hall, 1993).  We have an economic crisis, ideational collapse, 
no new ideational consolidation and minor policy change. 
  
Addendum: The Culliton Report 1991 
“The attempt to follow these new directions of policy scarcely had time to prove themselves 
before a new review of industrial policy was initiated in June 1991" (Kennedy, 1995: 60).  
The Industrial Policy Review Group's focus, set out in the Culliton Report (named after its 
chairman) was again on the indigenous sector (O’Grada, 1997: 119).  The report called for a 
reduction in grants and improving competiveness more generally, rather than picking winners 
(Newman, 2011, 241).   
 The central message was that the policy for industrial development goes beyond 
industrial policy as traditionally conceived (Kennedy, 1995).  It advocated the breakup of the 
IDA.  The result was "the creation of three agencies, with IDA-Ireland specialising in 
promoting foreign investment, Enterprise Ireland focusing on assisting indigenous enterprise, 
and ForFás concentrating on policy advice" (White, 2001: p. 223).  
 The continued overdependence on foreign capital was a major concern, with this 
report advocating the development of linkages between domestic and foreign firms (O’Hearn 
2001: 105).  This report's findings were similar to Telesis, despite the intervening decade.    
 
Conclusion 
According to theory, a critical juncture consists of crisis, ideational change and radical policy 
change, with ideational change linking crisis and policy change.  Following a crisis, policy 
failure and extant ideational collapse, significant policy change depends upon actors, led by a 
political entrepreneur, reaching consensus upon, and consolidating around, new ideas.  It is in 
the discursive interactions between the various actors that ideas are generated along with the 
potential for radical policy change.  As such, a discursive institutionalist approach is capable 
of overcoming new institutionalism’s inability to explain change. 
 Employing a range of observable implications, we did not find a critical juncture in 
industrial policy.  Although the economy was in crisis, and undermining confidence in 
prevailing industrial orthodoxy, neither of the main political parties was willing to challenge 
the status quo.  While ideational collapse occurred and alternatives were put forward, a 
political entrepreneur willing to champion a new set of ideas on industrial policy failed to 
emerge –extant orthodoxy endured. 
 In Ireland, since the 1950s, an outward orientated economic policy has remained 
unaltered, due to recognition that a large number of jobs and a high percentage of FDI, 
depend upon membership of the European Union (EU).  The economic crisis of the 1980s did 
not provoke a rethink of this overarching economic vision .  However, policy entrepreneurs 
questioned the focus of industrial policy.  There was growing skepticism of the long term 
benefits for the economy of a reliance on FDI and in particular its weak links with indigenous 
industry.  Following Telesis, industrial policy was changed to attract more sophisticated 
foreign companies that would base R&D functions in Ireland and thereby create higher value 
jobs; and to provide greater supports to indigenous industries which had previously been 
sidelined.  
 Now, 30 years after the events discussed, Ireland has become a modern knowledge 
based economy focusing on services and high-tech industries - many of which are foreign 
multinationals.  The intervening years have witnessed fiscal austerity, followed by the Celtic 
Tiger and then more austerity following the banking collapse (O’Rourke & Hogan, 2014). .  
The economy has also gone through widespread deregulation and privatization, all of which 
impacted upon industrial policy, but without shifting its underlying paradigm.  Thus, the 
attraction of FDI is still crucial.  Negotiations over the country’s recent IMF-EU bail-out saw 
a key element of industrial policy, the 12.5 percent corporation tax rate, asserted as non-
negotiable in the face of Franco-German pressure.  Foreign companies significant presence 
can also been seen in the difference between Ireland's GNP and GDP figures.  GNP, as a 
percentage of GDP, has ranged from a high of 85.6 percent in the third quarter of 2007, to a 
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Appendix A 
O1. Stagnant or negative GDP growth (Pei & Adesnik, 2000). 
O2.  Unemployment above 10 percent (Pei & Adesnik, 2000). 
O3. Inflation and interest rates above 10 percent (Pei & Adesnik, 2000). 
O4. National debt, as a percentage of GNP, exceeds 100 percent and is increasing at more 
than 10 percent, annually. 
O5. The level of economic openness declining. 
O6. Public perceives an economic crisis. 
O7. National/international media perceive an economic crisis. 
O8. Economic/political commentators perceive an economic crisis. 
O9. Central bank perceives an economic crisis. 
O10.  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) perceives an 
economic crisis. 
O11. Elected representatives perceive an economic crisis. 
O12. Government pronouncements on economy consistent with a crisis management 
approach. 
Appendix B 
Indication of Extant Ideational Collapse 
O13. Media question efficacy of the current model and/or specific policy areas.  
O14. Opposition parties critique the current model and propose alternative ideas – at election 
time their platform will be built around these alternatives. 
O15. Civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists (policy entrepreneurs) critique the 
current model and propose alternatives. 
O16. Civil society organizations, e.g., labor unions, employer organizations, consumer 
groups (policy entrepreneurs), critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s (1993) 
coalition-centered approach. 
O17. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable through 
opinion polls, protests, etc. 
O18. External/international organizations (policy entrepreneurs) critique the current model 
and/or actively disseminate alternative ideas. 
Indication of New Ideational Consolidation 
O19. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs. 
O20. A political entrepreneur injecting new ideas into the policy arena. 
O21. The political entrepreneur combines interests, including policy entrepreneurs, to 
produce consensus around a replacement paradigm. 
 
Appendix C 
Indication of Level of Policy Change 
O22. Policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of 
office) 
O23. The instruments of policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of 
office) 
O24. The goals behind policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one government’s term of 
office) 
 
